What would you say to Nietzsche?
Re: What would you say to Nietzsche?
Don't have time to write a real response (which is why I haven't responded to Dolan), but it is very odd. Didn't you prescribe a moral code earlier that whatever helps societies best thrive is moral (or something like that)..? Also I am completely confused by about your later statements. The answer to your question "Or, do you think that Man has progressed to a point intellectually that he can, indeed, do better than nature when it comes to creating stable social systems." would probably be yes, considering something like a democracy seems to be much more stable than the survival of the fittest agenda or whatever you are advocating.
Re: What would you say to Nietzsche?
I'm not prescribing moral codes, I'm describing them. Essentially, I'm saying that what works, works. Think twice before you go trying to change things that have allowed a lineage to survive since life began. That is, unless you know (not believe) that you have the mental capacity to see beyond the scope of natural selection.
Re: What would you say to Nietzsche?
Your post doesn't make much sense to me. 1st evolution doesn't have anything to do with what is 'right' or 'wrong' other than giving some naturalistic explanations for certain moral behaviors.
No where did I state we should change things in some radical way. Rather I was criticizing subjective morality as being inadequate and criticizing your very narrow usage of the word 'moral' which is not the common usage of the word.
No where did I state we should change things in some radical way. Rather I was criticizing subjective morality as being inadequate and criticizing your very narrow usage of the word 'moral' which is not the common usage of the word.
Re: What would you say to Nietzsche?
I have been busy and didn't take the time to respond, sorry for the late response. You made some interesting points in your last post.
It often does lead to metaphysics but I don't think the conversations are completely pointless. It can make a great difference in how one lives or orients their life depending on whether or not they believe in moral nihilism or a form of moral realism.
I shouldn't have used that term. Rather I was attempting (and failing) to explain that (at least under this position) moral facts are not reducible to any natural properties. It doesn't sound at all science fictiony to me that moral facts exist in the universe, but perhaps we differ here. Your example of the psychopath is interesting, but I doubt they would consider their made-up codes of honour as having any value relatable to what we consider morals to have.
I could provide arguments for it but doubt I could prove it.
I see much more motivation and plausibility if one wanted to reject objective morality to hold to something such as error theory rather than subjectivism. Error theory would hold that moral terms have descriptive meanings and we have moral beliefs, but they are uniformly false. It would due away with the troubles of moral infallibility and a strangeness to moral disagreement which subjectivism seems to hold.
Which is precisely why this kind of debates are pointless, since they inevitably lead to questions of grounding for "truths", basically metaphysics of some kind.
It often does lead to metaphysics but I don't think the conversations are completely pointless. It can make a great difference in how one lives or orients their life depending on whether or not they believe in moral nihilism or a form of moral realism.
To me the phrase "ultimate moral truth of the universe" sounds like a new type of science fiction.
I don't think you have a choice whether or not you care about morality or your behaviour. Even if you don't care, that's still a way to relate to moral questions. I mean, there is a paradoxical effect in the case of psychopaths that they despise common morals but are very strict abiders of their own made-up codes of honour. It's like no matter how you try to distort your inner sense of morality, it catches up with you eventually in some other form.
Cue the evidence from psychological research.
I shouldn't have used that term. Rather I was attempting (and failing) to explain that (at least under this position) moral facts are not reducible to any natural properties. It doesn't sound at all science fictiony to me that moral facts exist in the universe, but perhaps we differ here. Your example of the psychopath is interesting, but I doubt they would consider their made-up codes of honour as having any value relatable to what we consider morals to have.
I actually think I agree that you can't talk about non-subjective acts, but I disagree that you can't talk about non-subjective truth. The process in which one might have gone through in making a moral decision is subjective, but this does not mean that there isn't a non-subjective truth as to whether or not the act was moral.
Good luck proving that.
I could provide arguments for it but doubt I could prove it.
I see much more motivation and plausibility if one wanted to reject objective morality to hold to something such as error theory rather than subjectivism. Error theory would hold that moral terms have descriptive meanings and we have moral beliefs, but they are uniformly false. It would due away with the troubles of moral infallibility and a strangeness to moral disagreement which subjectivism seems to hold.
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